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WORKING DRAFT

INTERAGENCY GROUP ON SPACE

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM

March 25, 1986

CLASSIFIED BY: DoD/DUSD(P)

DECLASSIFY on OADR

FOREWORD

This draft report has been prepared in response to the directives received from the National Security Council Interagency Group (Space) per memorandum dated February 7th 1986, Rodney B. McDaniel to Donald P. Gregg and al., subject: IG (Space) Actions. It has been coordinated with the following:

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D. Taft / J. Struthers	Office of Management and Budget		
	Intelligence Community Staff		
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SECURITY NOTICE

Pending determination of the classification level of this report, it should be handled as **CONFIDENTIAL**. It will be distributed only to government personnel with established need to know in support of the Working Group.

COORDINATION STATUS

This working draft (Revision K) contains material not coordinated within the originating agencies. It has not been approved or endorsed by the Working Group of the Interagency Group (Space).

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Line Count

OUTLINE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMA	ARY	₹Y	
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(To be Supplied)

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I. INTRODUCTION

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In January 1986 the 25th Shuttle launch (Mission 51L) suffered a failure that resulted in the destruction of the orbiter CHALLENGER and the loss of its crew. The President ordered the establishment of an independent Presidential Commission (Executive Order ______), known as the "Rogers Commis-sion", after its Chairman, Secretary William P. Rogers, to establish the causes of the accident and to recommend corrective actions by June 1986. The Intergaecy Group rsponsible for theis report was separately charged with assessing the impact on the nations' launch capability, and the impact of delaying the deployment of satellites scheduled before the accident, and with identifying the appropriate recovery options. The report of the IG(Space) Group was requested on an accelerated basis in order to preserve the President's option of submitting an FY 86 supplemental budget request in support of the implementation of recovery actions. Some have argued that the recovery/reconsitution actions (specifically those related to the procurement of a replacement orbiter) should await the conclusions of the Rogers Commission for both political and programmatic reasons. The IG(Space) believes, however, that the replacement orbiter will not be affected by the Rogers Commission's recommendations in regard to remedial actions in respect to other aprts of the STS. Thus far, the Commission's inquiry has not implicated the CHALLENGER itself in the causes of the accident. Should the Commission's work result in the need for modification in the repalcement orbiter, this will be known in ample time to be incorporated in the orbiter's normal production cycle.

New Text from ICS

This Interagency Group (Space) report responds to the National Security Council directive dated February 7, 1986 on the subject of recovery from the accidental loss of the STS orbiter CHALLENGER on January 28, 1986.

Adapted from Chapter I of Revision GA of Resource

Three specific objectives have been set forth for the study reported here. First, consider, and report on, the possible impacts on the nation's space launch capabilities to implement the national space policies. Second, summarize the recommendations made by the cognizant agencies on the ways to mitigate the immediate impact of the CHALLENGER accident on the on-going three sectors of the U.S. space activities: national security, civil, and commercial. Third, develop and assess the measures to be taken for reconstituting the U.S. means for providing assured access to space in order to accommodate the President's broad space policy objectives. The Group was encouraged to identify any longer-term policy issues that may require future consideration in the light of the CHALLENGER accident.

In broad terms, the several tasks have been completed. Two essential questions have not been answered: how will the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the causes of the CHALLENGER accident ("Rogers Commission") impinge upon the schedule and the cost of regaining operational status of the Space Transportation System; and are there sound approaches for providing the resources recommended for the reconstitution. The Interagency Group has made assumptions on the effects of the Rogers Commission's recommendations and has limited its work to the identification of the funding requirements associated with the recommendations. In regard to the latter, the views of the Office of Management and Budget are made part of the report.

Chapter II is a brief recapitulation of the background that undergirds the discussion and in part contributes to the rationale used for developing the recommendations.

Chapter III discusses the impacts on policy implementation and the means for mitigating the impact on our immediate space launch capability prior to resumption of operations and in the following period when the 3-orbiter STS fleet is operational.

Chapter IV is the discussion of the possible reconstitution strategies, under the assumption that there is no change in the pre-accident requirements model (except for schedule adjustment). This model reflects the U.S. space program as included the President's 1987 budget submittal to Congress. The space launch strategies, rationales, altyernatives and the corresponding funding requirements are presented.

Chapter V discusses the policy issues, in particular as regards the commercial expendable launch vehicle industry and the longer-term future of the STS. Chapter VI discusses two specific major areas of concern, only peripherally addressed by the IG(Space) Working Group; namely the matter of timing with respect to the Presidential Commission's report and the issue of budget mechanisms whereby the remedial actions can be financed. In closing, Chapter VI summarizes the findings and recommendations.

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OPTION DESCRIPTION SUMMARY

CHARACTERISTICS	OPTION ONE Re-Establish the Status Quo	OPTION TWO No Orbiter Replacment and Procurement of Maximum Number of ELVs	OPTION THREE "Balanced Launcher Fleet" Replacement Orbiter by '90 Maximum ELV Buy	OPTION THREE A "Balanced Launcher Fleet" Replacement Orbiter by '92 Maximum ELV Buy
Shuttle / Orbiters				
Replacement Buy	1			
LL Struct. Spares	yes			
Vandenberg LS	yes			
Flight Rates 87-88-89-90-9195	6-14-18-2024			
ELV Procurement	10 CELVs			
Addl. Buy	0		·	
Procurement Rate	0-2-2-2-2			·
ELV Launch Rate	TBD			
Backlog 87 through 93	20-25-31-35			

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OPTION DESCRIPTION SUMMARY **OPTION OPTION** OPTION THREE **OPTION THREE A** TWO "Balanced Launcher Fleet" **CHARACTERISTICS** ONE "Balanced Launcher Fleet" No Orbiter Replacment and Replacement Orbiter by '90 Replacement Orbiter by '92 Procurement of Maximum ELV Buy Re-Establish the Status Quo Maximum Number of ELVs Maximum ELV Buy **Shuttle / Orbiters** 1 Replacement Buy yes LL Struct. Spares yes Vandenberg LS Flight Rates 6-14-18-20-..24 87-88-89-90-91..95 10 CELVs **ELV Procurement** 0 Addl. Buy 0-2-2-2-2 Procurement Rate **ELV Launch Rate TBD** Backlog 87 through 93 20-25-31-35----

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